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Abstract

This paper examines the extent to which racial and ethnic disparities exist in the
implementation of California’s “Three Strikes and You’re Out” law. The analysis then examines
whether racial and ethnic disparities vary by type of offense. Logistic regression analysis of
individual-level data on over 171,000 California prison inmates indicates that African-Americans
are more likely than whites and Latinos to receive third-strike sentences, even when legally
relevant variables are controlled. The analysis also finds that Latino defendants are significantly
less likely to receive third-strike sentences. The analysis finds that the black-white gap is greater
for offenses known as “wobblers,” which can be filed as either felonies or misdemeanors (i.e.
offenses for which prosecutors have greater discretion in the charging decision), than for
offenses that must always be charged as felonies. Racial disparities are also greater for property
and drug offenses than for violent crimes.
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The Liberation Hypothesis and Racial and Ethnic Disparities
in the Application of California’s Three Strikes Law1
Introduction, Background, and Hypotheses
Criminal sentencing laws are usually enacted at the state or national level, but the
implementation of most policies takes place at the local level of government. For example,
California’s “Three Strikes and You’re Out” law is implemented in large part by district
attorneys and judges, elected county officials whose practices and policies may reflect the
attitudes of the constituencies that voted them into office. Mandatory sentencing laws like
“Three Strikes” are designed to limit the degree of discretion that decision-makers in the criminal
justice system are permitted to exercise. However, some flexibility exists in the law’s
implementation. Prosecutors can move to dismiss prior convictions that might count as strikes,
“in the furtherance of justice.” According to the “letter of the law,” any offender who has two or
more serious or violent “strikes” shall face a mandatory sentence of twenty-five years to life in
prison for any subsequent felony conviction regardless of the severity of the current offense, but
in some counties, prosecutors do not initiate Three Strikes proceedings unless the new conviction
is for a serious or violent offense. Discretion is exercised by prosecutors in the case filing
decision: for certain offenses, known as “wobblers,” the prosecutor must decide whether to
charge the crime as a felony (which, upon conviction, would include a prison term and trigger a
second- or third-strike sentence for a defendant with one or more prior serious or violent
convictions) or a misdemeanor (which would not). Prosecutors and judges may also reduce prior
convictions for “wobbler” offenses from felonies to misdemeanors retroactively, or charge single
or multiple counts, one or more of which may be strikes, from a single incident. District
Attorneys retain the authority to craft internal policies regarding how the Three Strikes law is
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applied. A central question in the current investigation is whether this discretion is exercised to
the advantage or disadvantage of certain racial or ethnic groups.
This paper investigates this question empirically, using a previously unavailable dataset
containing individual-level records for over 171,000 inmates in the California prison system.
Logistic regression models are designed to measure the extent of racial and ethnic disparity in
the Three Strikes sentencing process, when demographic characteristics and legally relevant
variables, including conviction offense, prior record, and parole status are held constant. The
analysis finds that some, but not all, of the observed racial/ethnic disparities can be explained by
these factors, and that African-Americans fare much worse than whites, even when demographic
and legal factors are controlled. It is also clear that prosecutorial or judicial discretion is
exercised, particularly for less serious offenses. The analysis finds that this disadvantages
African-Americans, but it seems to work in Latino and immigrant offenders’ favor.
Background on Implementation and Impacts of “Three Strikes” and Mandatory
Minimum Sentencing Laws
In 1994, at the height of a national movement to “get tough on crime,” the “Three Strikes
and You’re Out” law passed in California by ballot initiative with 72 percent public support, and
was confirmed by the state legislature. “Three Strikes” has two main components: first, if a
defendant has a prior conviction for a serious or violent offense (i.e. a “strike”) and is convicted
of a subsequent felony, the sentence for the current felony conviction is automatically doubled.
This is referred to as the law’s “second strike” provision. Second, if a defendant has two or more
prior serious or violent felony convictions, as specified in California penal code sections 667.5(c)
and 1192.7(c), any subsequent felony conviction carries a mandatory “third-strike” sentence of
25 years to life in prison (Ricciardulli, 2002).2 Three Strikes has ardent supporters along with
vehement critics, and the latter group includes many who believe that the law is applied
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disproportionately against African-Americans and Latinos (Ehlers, Schiraldi, & Lotke, 2004;
Families to Amend California's Three Strikes, 2006).
Indeed, African-Americans are heavily overrepresented among second- and third-strike
inmates. As shown in Table 1, they make up about 35 percent of second-strikers and 45 percent
of third-strikers among California prison inmates, despite the fact that African-Americans
constitute only slightly more than 6 percent of California’s adult population (California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 2005; United States Census Bureau Population
Division, 2004). Whites, on the other hand, make up over half of the California adult population
but only about one-quarter of second- and third-strike inmates (California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation, 2005; United States Census Bureau Population Division, 2004).
Relative to their share of the adult population, Latino inmates are overrepresented among
second-strike inmates, but underrepresented among third-strikers. However, these patterns of
over- and underrepresentation do not necessarily indicate that discrimination is present; they may
be due to variation among groups in eligibility for “strikes” sentences. This study investigates
the extent to which “legally relevant” variables such as the defendants’ offenses and criminal
records explain intergroup differences in second- and third-strike sentences, and if not, whether
the degree of prosecutorial discretion given to prosecutors is associated with the disparities.
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]

Theoretical Frameworks: Focal Concerns Theory and Liberation Hypothesis
The discussion of whether and how race influences sentencing has spanned more than
five decades, with substantial inconsistency in both research methods and conclusions, ranging
from findings of greater sentence severity for black and Latino defendants to findings of apparent
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leniency towards defendants from the same groups (Albonetti, 1991). Recent work by
Steffensmeier, Ulmer, and Kramer (1998) finds that race, gender, and age have both independent
and interactive effects on sentencing outcomes, with defendants who are young, black, and male
experiencing the most negative outcomes. The authors conclude that judges’ sentencing
decisions are mostly based on “legally relevant variables” such as offense severity and prior
record, but these decisions are also influenced by their assessment of the offenders with regard to
three main “focal concerns”: “blameworthiness” and harm done to the victim, “dangerousness”
of the offender, and “practical constraints and consequences,” including a wide range of factors
from courtroom workgroup dynamics to “local politics and community norms” (Steffensmeier,
Ulmer, & Kramer, 1998). Steffensmeier and his co-authors suggest that judges’ assessments of
these focal concerns could be influenced by stereotypes and expectations associated with
defendant characteristics such as race, gender, and age, and their empirical findings support this
idea.
I hypothesize that similar dynamics influence both Three Strikes sentencing outcomes
and, more broadly, felony sentences in California. Not only are race, gender, and age likely to
influence judges’ decisions, but these factors are also likely to affect charging decisions made by
prosecutors. Although both judges and prosecutors have legal authority to exercise discretion in
the application of Three Strikes, mandatory sentencing policies tend to shift the power to make
sentencing decisions from judges to prosecutors (Greenwood et al., 1998; Kieso, 2005; Miethe,
1987; Misner, 1996; Ricciardulli, 2002; Zimring, Kamin, & Hawkins, 1999). In Three Strikes
cases, prosecutorial discretion is particularly important because the sentence associated with a
third-strike charge is extremely long and not negotiable.
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The adoption and implementation of “Three Strikes and You’re Out” in California has
been described as “the largest penal experiment in American history” (Zimring et al., 1999).
This vast sentencing reform provides an unusual opportunity to test leading theories on the use of
prosecutorial discretion and the impacts of extralegal factors in the determination of sentencing
outcomes. The data collected for this study make it possible to conduct rigorous empirical
analyses to support or refute the widely-asserted belief that discretion in the application of Three
Strikes is exercised to the disadvantage of certain groups, particularly African Americans or
Latinos. Analysis of individual-level data will represent a significant improvement over existing
analyses primarily based on aggregate statistics (Ehlers et al., 2004; Kieso, 2005).
Prosecutorial Discretion and Mandatory Minimums
Mandatory minimum laws like “Three Strikes and You’re Out” are clearly intended to
restrict the amount of discretion, especially leniency, allowable in the sentencing of repeat
offenders. How, then, is it possible for Three Strikes be applied more aggressively against
certain defendants? The answer may lie in the “wiggle room” that remains for prosecutorial and
judicial discretion in the law’s application.
“In the furtherance of justice,” a prosecuting attorney may file a motion to dismiss one or
more prior convictions that would otherwise count as strikes, thus sparing a defendant the
mandatory third-strike sentence of 25 years to life if convicted (Legislative Analyst's Office,
2005).3 District Attorneys, who are county-level elected officials in California, retain the legal
authority to determine guidelines and policies regarding the circumstances under which attorneys
in their offices charge eligible cases as third strikes or petition the court to waive prior offenses
(Bowers, 2001; California Legislative Analyst's Office, 2005; Olson, 2000). Discretion may also
be exercised by prosecutors or judges to charge certain offenses known as “wobblers” as either
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felonies (which trigger Three Strikes) or misdemeanors (which, in sharp contrast, carry a
maximum sentence of one year in jail), or to charge multiple counts, including strikes, from a
single incident (Legislative Analyst's Office, 2005; Ricciardulli, 2002).
Liberation Hypothesis and Sentencing Disparities for Different Offense Types
There are numerous reasons to believe that racial and ethnic sentencing disparities may
be greater for certain criminal offenses than for others. Several criminal justice researchers have
found that minorities are overarrested at higher rates for less serious nonviolent offenses than for
serious or violent crimes, and that disproportionalities are greatest for drug offenses, including
those associated with the “War on Drugs,” where there is more subjectivity in the process of
searching or arresting suspects or filing charges (Barnes & Kingsnorth, 1996; Beckett, Nysop, &
Pfingst, 2006; Blumstein, 1983, 1993; Klein, Petersilia, & Turner, 1990; Miller, 1996; Petersilia,
1983; Tonry, 1995). According to the “liberation hypothesis,” originally set forth by Kalven and
Zeisel (1966), jurors in a criminal trial are more likely to deviate from the facts of a case, and
therefore allow their decisions to be influenced by personal opinions or values, when the
evidence against the defendant is less conclusive, i.e. when they are “liberated” from legal
constraints such as convincing eyewitness testimony, a recovered firearm, clear injury to the
victim, extreme heinousness of the offense, or similar factors that, if present, would reduce
ambiguity regarding the appropriate verdict (Kalven & Zeisel, 1966; Reskin & Visher, 1986;
Spohn & Cederblom, 1991; Walker, Spohn, & DeLone, 1996). Penalties are relatively clearly
defined for serious and violent offenses, but for lesser crimes, less consensus exists regarding
appropriate levels of punishment; therefore there is more potential for juror discretion, which
may include consideration of “legally irrelevant factors such as race” (Spohn & Cederblom,
1991; Walker et al., 1996). “Wobblers,” discussed above, fall into the latter category of crimes
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due to the considerable legal latitude involved in the process of filing charges. In their 1991
study using data from Michigan, Spohn and Cederblom found that black defendants were
sentenced more harshly than whites for assault, but not for more serious offenses such as murder,
robbery, and rape. This paper seeks to examine whether the same dynamic holds true in
California, even under a mandatory minimum policy like Three Strikes, which presumably limits
flexibility, and might therefore leave less room for arbitrariness or discrimination in sentencing.
Summary of Hypotheses
In light of the background, theory, and hypotheses presented above, this investigation
seeks to test the following hypotheses:


H1: Because they are associated with certain “focal concerns,” demographic
characteristics of defendants, such as race, ethnicity, age, and gender, are likely to
influence Three Strikes sentencing outcomes. The analysis will examine whether the
effects of these factors on Three Strikes sentences consistent with those found in previous
studies of sentencing, such as those by Steffensmeier and his colleagues (Demuth &
Steffensmeier, 2004; Steffensmeier et al., 1998). Because a defendant’s demographic
traits play a role in the assessment of “focal concerns,” I hypothesize that observed racial
and ethnic disparities in third-strikes sentences will be reduced, but not entirely
eliminated, when “legally relevant” control variables, such as prior record and offense
severity, are introduced in the analysis.



H2: The liberation hypothesis predicts that disparities will vary by offense, with
defendants’ extralegal characteristics more likely to influence charging decisions for
offenses whose penalties are less clearly agreed-upon. Racial and ethnic minorities may
therefore be more likely than whites to be charged as felons for “wobblers” (i.e. crimes
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which may be charged as either felonies or misdemeanors). By the same token, there will
also be greater observed disparity between racial and ethnic groups in Three Strikes
sentencing for non-violent offenders than for violent offenders.

Data and Methods
Offender-level Data
The analysis is conducted on data obtained by special request from the California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) in September 2006. The first dataset
includes individual-level records for all 171,163 felony offenders housed in the California prison
system on August 31, 2006. The following variables are included in each record:










Defendant’s race
Ethnicity (Hispanic origin)
Sex
Age
Commitment county
Current offense(s)
Probation or parole status
Sentence length
2-strikes or 3-strikes sentence

The CDCR dataset has some limitations. It includes inmates who received a prison
sentence, but not those who received jail terms, probation, drug treatment, or other alternative
sentences. Because of this, it does not include records for defendants whose “wobbler” offenses
were charged as misdemeanors, or those charged with felonies who were not convicted. Data on
dropped or reduced charges, which have been found to be important and sometimes to vary by
race (Adams & Cutshall, 1987; Albonetti, 1987, 1992), are not available from this source. To
my knowledge, there is no centralized database available to the public that contains a large
sample of individual-level cases from arrest through sentencing in California. These data would
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have to be obtained from the courts or created by matching police arrest files to court records and
inmate files; this is outside the scope of this study.
Wobblers and Non-wobblers
The data include the records for “wobbler” offenders who were charged with felonies,
convicted, and sent to prison. Of the 532 separate offense codes included in the dataset, 143 are
“wobblers,” meaning that the prescribed penalty under California's sentencing guidelines
includes either a prison term or an alternate sentence of a jail term, a fine, or a combination of
the two (Judicial Council of California, 2007). As discussed above, the charging decision for
these types of offenses is significant, because the decision to file a “wobbler” as a misdemeanor
rather than as a felony can spare a defendant with one or more prior serious or violent
convictions either the mandatory doubled second-strike sentence or the mandatory third-strike
sentence of 25 years to life in prison. Offenses that do not fall under the “wobbler” description
are referred to in this paper as “non-wobblers;” these crimes must be always charged as felonies,
and therefore will always lead to second- or third-strikes sentences for eligible offenders upon
conviction. The offense codes in the dataset have been coded as wobblers or non-wobblers,
based on the sentences prescribed in the California Penal Code, Health and Safety Code,
Business and Professions Code, Vehicle Code, Welfare and Revenue Code, Harbor and
Navigations Code, Insurance Code, Revenue and Taxation Code, Government Code, Civil Code,
or Corporations Code. All of the inmates whose records are in the dataset were convicted of
felonies. Thirty-two percent of the inmates were sent to prison after being convicted of a
wobbler offense charged as a felony rather than as a misdemeanor; the remaining sixty-eight
percent were sentenced for non-wobblers.
Methods
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The preliminary analyses reported in this paper employ logistic models with a dummy
variable representing the presence or absence of a third-strike sentence as the primary dependent
variable. The primary independent variables of interest are the dummy variables associated with
the mutually exclusive race/ethnicity categories, African-American, Hispanic/Latino, white,
Asian, American Indian, and “other.” Other demographic variables included in the model
include those representing gender, immigrant status, and age (six categories). Control variables
include parole status (dummy variables representing new offense, parole violation, and parole
hearing pending), offense type (thirty-six mutually exclusive categories), number of prior serious
offenses, and number of prior violent offenses. Selected summary statistics are presented in
Table 2 below.
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]

As shown in Table 2 above, counties are categorized and coded based on the type of
internal policy (if any) the District Attorney has implemented regarding the treatment of secondand third-strikes eligible cases. An indicator representing county-level policy is constructed
using information gathered from interviews with representatives from the local District
Attorneys’ offices, examination of position papers or public statements published in the print
media, other publications, or online sources, and interviews with representatives from County
Public Defenders’ offices if no information can be obtained from the DA. This step tests the
hypothesis that extralegal factors such as a defendant’s race or ethnicity will have greater
influence on the assessment of “focal concerns” by prosecutors in jurisdictions that permit the
highest degree of prosecutorial discretion.
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Findings and Discussion
Table 3 below compares the results of two logistic regression models. The first model
includes several demographic measures: race/ethnicity, immigrant status, sex, and age. Trial
county is also included. This model produces statistically significant odds ratio estimates
indicating that African-Americans have 1.85 times greater odds of receiving third strike
sentences than whites, and American Indians have 1.42 times higher odds of receiving third
strike sentences than whites. Individuals born outside the United States have significantly lower
odds of receiving third strike sentences than native-born offenders (odds ratio = 0.63). Men face
much higher odds than women of receiving Three Strikes sentences, with an odds ratio of 9.25
attached to the dummy variable for Male.
Adding a set of legally relevant variables to the model – number of serious and violent
prior convictions, parole status, and offense category (36 categories coded as dummy variables,
not displayed in Table 3) – greatly enhances the explanatory power of the model, with the rsquared value increasing from 0.09 to 0.31. Not surprisingly, all of these additional variables,
which represent the factors that are supposed to be considered in the sentencing process, are
highly statistically significant (p < 0.001). In addition, the inclusion of legally relevant variables
reduces the observed racial/ethnic disparities, shrinking the odds ratio associated with Black
from 1.85 to 1.47. The odds ratio associated with American Indian decreases only slightly, from
1.42 to 1.40, and the ratio associated with immigrant status moves closer to 1. The odds ratio for
Latino ethnicity is slightly less than 1 in both models, and it is significant when the legally
relevant variables are controlled. The Male odds ratio falls substantially with the legally relevant
controls, but men still face 5.05 times higher odds than women of being sentenced under Three
Strikes. The “immigrant effect” is also tempered, with the associated odds ratio increasing from
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0.63 to 0.76. Although the odds ratios associated with several demographic traits grow smaller
when legally relevant factors are controlled, it is notable that they remain significant, and in
many cases, substantial in size.
These findings confirm the first hypothesis, which predicted that demographic
characteristics would exert an influence on Three Strikes sentencing even with legally relevant
variables controlled, due to the role of these characteristics in the assessment of “focal concerns”
by decision-makers in the criminal justice system, such as prosecutors, judges, or juries.
However, it is interesting to observe that Latinos and members of other minority groups do not
appear to experience the same consistent disadvantage with regard to sentencing that AfricanAmericans do, and immigrants seem to receive consistently lighter sentences than native-born
offenders.
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]

Table 4 below displays the results of a test of Hypothesis 2. Two logistic regression
models are estimated, using separate subsets of the data. The analysis is performed first on the
cases for which the current conviction was for a “wobbler” offense, and then on the “nonwobbler” cases. The results show that the disparity between African-Americans and whites in
Three Strikes sentencing is greater for wobbler offenses (odds ratio = 1.56) than it is for nonwobbler offenses (odds ratio = 1.44). Furthermore, there appears to be disparity in favor of
Latinos when their offenses are wobblers (odds ratio = 0.76), but there is no statistically
significant difference in odds between Latinos and whites for non-wobblers. In contrast, the
interaction term representing Latino*immigrant has an odds ratio of 1.56 and is significant at p <
0.05 in the wobblers model, but is closer to 1 and not statistically significant in the non-wobblers
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model. The odds ratios associated with the American Indian dummy variable are close in
magnitude to those for African-Americans, but significant only in the non-wobbler analysis.
Like the analyses shown in Table 3, these analyses show that men have about 5 times higher
odds than women of receiving Three Strikes sentences; this is the case regardless of whether the
current conviction is for a wobbler or non-wobbler.
These findings are consistent with Hypothesis 2, which predicts that sentencing
disparities will be greater for offenses whose associated penalties are less clearly defined (e.g.
wobblers), than for offenses for which there is more consensus regarding appropriate
punishments (e.g. non-wobblers).
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]

To further test Hypothesis 2, another set of models is compared. Table 5 below displays
the results of three separate logistic regression models, run on subsets of the data according to
offense type: violent, property, or drug.
The liberation hypothesis would predict that racial and ethnic disparities in sentencing
would be greater for less serious offenses (i.e. property and drug crimes) than for violent
offenses, and the results of the analysis are consistent with this prediction. The odds ratio
associated with the dummy variable Black is 1.35 in the violent offender analysis, but higher –
1.76 and 1.52, respectively – in the property and drug offender analyses. This finding is similar
to those of Spohn and Cederblom (1991). Consistent with the findings of the analyses
summarized in the previous two tables, an apparent disparity in favor of Latinos is present (odds
ratio = 0.86) and statistically significant in the violent offender analysis. However, the odds ratio
is closer to 1 and not significant in analyses of the property and drug offender subsets. This runs
counter to the hypothesis that racial/ethnic disparities (in either the positive or negative direction)
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will be greatest for the least severe offenses. The findings for Latinos born outside the United
States are more consistent with the liberation hypothesis. The odds ratio on the
Latino*Immigrant interaction term are greatest and statistically significant in the property crime
model (odds ratio = 1.66, p < 0.05), but closer to 1 and not significant in the other two models.
The odds ratio associated with the variable Male remains consistent (ranging from 5.11 to 5.32)
and significant (p < .001) in the models for all three crime categories.

Conclusions and Policy Implications
The preceding analyses tested a set of hypotheses based on focal concerns theory and the
liberation hypothesis. Consistent with the findings of prior investigations of sentencing
disparities, the analysis indicates that disparities in Three Strikes sentencing outcomes are
present, even when several key legally relevant variables are controlled. African-American
offenders appear to be significantly more likely than whites to receive third-strike sentences,
even when the nature of the offense, the defendant’s prior record, and parole status are
controlled. The same is true for American Indians. The disparity between male and female
offenders in Three Strikes sentencing is even greater than that between blacks and whites. This
is likely a result of the assessment of “focal concerns” such as “dangerousness” of the offender
(female felons may be considered less of a threat to society than male felons), “practical
constraints and consequences” such as limited capacity in women’s correctional facilities or
concerns about finding appropriate caregivers for the women’s custodial children, or
“blameworthiness,” especially for women who may have been provoked or abused
(Steffensmeier, Kramer, & Streifel, 1993; Steffensmeier et al., 1998).
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A notable and perhaps unexpected finding is that Latino offenders experience sentencing
disparities, but to their advantage rather than disadvantage. Where significant effects were
detected for immigrant status, these were also in the form of lower odds of a Three Strikes
sentence. These observations may indicate leniency in the sentencing of Latinos and foreignborn defendants. An alternative explanation is that substantial portions of these groups are
deported either before or after they are convicted, leaving fewer repeat offenders in the prison
population. While the explanation merits further examination, one important conclusion to draw
from these findings is that African-Americans and Latinos do not experience the same
disadvantage in the sentencing process; therefore, it is instructive to look beyond a black-andwhite typology when studying the role of race and ethnicity in the justice system.
The liberation hypothesis receives support from the outcomes of the analyses. Disparities
between blacks and whites are found to be wider in the sentencing of wobbler offenses than for
non-wobblers, and the black-white sentencing gap is also greater for property or drug offenses
than for violent crimes. These findings are consistent with those of past studies indicating that
extralegal factors are more likely to influence juries when the offense in question is less serious.
In the case of Three Strikes, the implications of a third-strike sentence for a wobbler are
enormous. A wobbler charged as a misdemeanor will receive a sentence of one year in jail or
less, and the standard, non-strikes sentence for most wobbler offenses is about 24 months in
prison, which would be doubled to 48 months for a second-striker. However, a third-strike
wobbler conviction carries a mandatory 25-to-life prison term. Thus, the presence of
inappropriate disparities in Three Strikes sentencing for cases like these is especially disturbing.
Perhaps the most controversial aspect of Three Strikes has been the eligibility of
nonviolent offenders for mandatory prison terms of 25 years to life under the law. Critics of
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Three Strikes argue that the law’s inclusion of all felons with “strikes,” rather than a narrow class
of offenders, violates the legal principle of proportionality for crimes and punishments (Kieso,
2005; Zimring, Hawkins, & Kamin, 2001). The analyses above indicate that a different form of
injustice may be present in the law’s application towards nonviolent criminals: it is among
property and drug offenders that the greatest disparities between black and white offenders are
observed. This finding is consistent with the liberation hypothesis.
Even in the application of a mandatory minimum sentencing policy in a determinate
sentencing state, racial sentencing disparities appear to persist. In California, the Three Strikes
law still does appear to be disproportionately applied against African-American defendants. To
the extent that disparities in sentencing outcomes result from decisions made, consciously or
unintentionally, by participants and authorities in the criminal justice system, it may be possible
to mitigate or prevent discriminatory applications of the law. Determination of the extent of the
problem and potential points for intervention may lead to closer examination of policies and
practices in certain agencies, which could in turn result in improved efforts to ensure fairness in
the administration of laws like Three Strikes. The reduction of racial disparities in sentencing
policies could have enormous effects on the lives of sentenced individuals and their families, as
well as the communities from which black inmates originate and to which most of them will
eventually return. In a society where black men face a 29 percent chance of incarceration during
their lifetime, more black male dropouts are imprisoned than employed, and 7 percent of all
African-American children have an incarcerated parent (Bonczar & Beck, 1997; Travis &
Petersilia, 2001), progress in the understanding, reduction, and prevention of sentencing
disparities between African-Americans and whites is long overdue.
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NOTES
1

The author wishes to thank Alexander Friedman for research assistance and the Santa Clara
University Faculty-Student Research Assistant Program for support for this project.
Laws called “Three Strikes and You’re Out” also exist in twenty-three other states and at the
federal level, but they are considerably narrower in scope, application, cost, and societal impact
than California’s law; all three offenses must be serious or violent felonies in order to qualify for
Three Strikes sentencing in most jurisdictions other than California (Clark, Austin, & Henry,
1997).
2

3

A California Supreme Court ruling in the 1996 case People v. Superior Court (Romero)
determined that judges could exercise the same discretion, though some legal scholars have
concluded that this power has seldom been exercised (Ricciardulli, 2002; Vitiello, 1997a,
1997b).
4

Sources: State population data from United States Census Bureau Population Division (2005),
Table 4: Estimates of the Population by Race and Hispanic or Latino Origin for the United States
and States: July 1, 2005; all other statistics in this table calculated using August 31, 2006 inmate
population data provided by the CA Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.

REFERENCES
Adams, K., & Cutshall, C. R. (1987). Refusing to prosecute minor offenses: The relative
influence of legal and extralegal factors. Justice Quarterly, 4(4), 595-609.
Albonetti, C. A. (1987). Prosecutorial Discretion: The Effects of Uncertainty. Law & Society
Review, 21(2), 291-314.
Albonetti, C. A. (1991). An Integration of Theories to Explain Judicial Discretion. Social
Problems, 38(2), 247-266.
Albonetti, C. A. (1992). Charge Reduction: An Analysis of Prosecutorial Discretion in Burglary
and Robbery Cases. Journal of Quantitative Criminology, 8(3), 317-333.
Barnes, C. W., & Kingsnorth, R. (1996). Race, Drugs, and Criminal Sentencing: Hidden Effects
of the Criminal Law. Journal of Criminal Justice, 24(1), 39-56.
Beckett, K., Nysop, K., & Pfingst, L. (2006). Race, Drugs, and Policing: Understanding
Disparities in Drug Delivery Arrests. Criminology, 44(1), 105-137.
Blumstein, A. (1983). Prisons: Population, Capacity, and Alternatives. In J. Q. Wilson (Ed.),
Crime and Public Policy. San Francisco: ICS Press.

17

Liberation Hypothesis and Three Strikes

Blumstein, A. (1993). Racial Disproportionality of U.S. Prisons Revisited. University of
Colorado Law Review, 64, 743-760.
Bonczar, T. P., & Beck, A. J. (1997). Lifetime Likelihood of Going to State or Federal Prison.
Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of
Justice Statistics.
Bowers, J. E. (2001). The Integrity of the Game is Everything: The Problem of Geographic
Disparity in Three Strikes. New York University Law Review, 76(4), 1164-1203.
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. (2005). Second and Third Strikers in
the Institution Population, June 30, 2005. Sacramento, CA: California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation, Offender Information Services, Estimates and Statistical
Analysis Section, Data Analysis Unit.
California Legislative Analyst's Office. (2005). A Primer: Three Strikes: The Impact After More
than a Decade. Sacramento, CA: Legislative Analyst's Office.
Clark, J., Austin, J., & Henry, D. A. (1997). "Three Strikes and You're Out": A Review of State
Legislation. Washington DC: National Institute of Justice.
Demuth, S., & Steffensmeier, D. (2004). Ethnicity Effects on Sentence Outcomes in Large
Urban Courts: Comparisons Among White, Black, and Hispanic Defendants. Social
Science Quarterly, 85(4), 994-1011.
Ehlers, S., Schiraldi, V., & Lotke, E. (2004). Racial Divide: An Examination of the Impact of
California's Three Strikes Law on African-Americans and Latinos. Washington, DC:
Justice Policy Institute.
Families to Amend California's Three Strikes. (2006). 3-Strikes is Applied Disproportionately to
Minorities, Poor and Particular Counties. Retrieved March 8, 2006, from
http://www.facts1.com/reasons/minor.htm#racial
Greenwood, P., Everingham, S., Chen, E., Abrahamse, A. F., Merritt, N., & Chiesa, J. (1998).
Three Strikes Revisited: An Early Assessment of Implementation and Effects (No. NCJRS
Report Number 194106). Santa Monica: RAND.
Judicial Council of California, A. O. o. t. C. (2007). CJER Felony Sentencing Handbook.
Oakland, CA: Continuing Education of the Bar, California.
Kalven, H., & Zeisel, H. (1966). The American Jury. Boston: Little.
Kieso, D. W. (2005). Unjust sentencing and the California Three Strikes law. New York: LFB
Scholarly Pub.
Klein, S., Petersilia, J., & Turner, S. (1990). Race and Imprisonment Decisions in California.
Science, 247(4944), 812-816.

18

Liberation Hypothesis and Three Strikes

Legislative Analyst's Office. (2005). A Primer: Three Strikes: The Impact After More than a
Decade. Sacramento, CA: Legislative Analyst's Office.
Miethe, T. D. (1987). Charging and Plea Bargaining Practices under Determinate Sentencing: An
Investigation of the Hydraulic Displacement of Discretion. The Journal of Criminal Law
and Criminology, 78(1), 155-176.
Miller, J. G. (1996). Search and Destroy: African-American Males in the Criminal Justice
System. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Misner, R. L. (1996). Recasting Prosecutorial Discretion. Journal of Criminal Law and
Criminology, 86(3), 717-777.
Olson, T. M. (2000). Strike One Ready for More? The Consequences of Plea Bargaining 'First
Strike' Offenders under California's 'Three Strikes' Law. California Western Law Review,
36(2), 545.
Petersilia, J. (1983). Racial Disparities in the Criminal Justice System. Santa Monica, CA: Rand.
Reskin, B. F., & Visher, C. A. (1986). The Impacts of Evidence and Extralegal Factors in Jurors'
Decisions. Law & Society Review, 20(3), 423-438.
Ricciardulli, A. (2002). The Broken Safety Valve: Judicial Discretion's Failure to Ameliorate
Punishment Under California's Three Strikes Law. Duquesne Law Review, 41(1), 1-67.
Spohn, C., & Cederblom, J. (1991). Race and Disparities in Sentencing: A Test of the Liberation
Hypothesis. Justice Quarterly, 8(3), 305 - 327.
Steffensmeier, D., Kramer, J., & Streifel, C. (1993). Gender and Imprisonment Decisions.
Criminology, 31(3), 411-446.
Steffensmeier, D., Ulmer, J., & Kramer, J. (1998). The Interaction of Race, Gender, and Age in
Criminal Sentencing: The Punishment Cost of Being Young, Black, and Male.
Criminology, 36(4), 763–798.
Tonry, M. H. (1995). Malign Neglect: Race, Crime, and Punishment in America. New York:
Oxford University Press.
Travis, J., & Petersilia, J. (2001). Reentry Reconsidered: A New Look at an Old Question. Crime
and Delinquency, 47(3), 291-313.
United States Census Bureau Population Division. (2004, Release Date: September 30, 2004).
Table 4: Annual Estimates of the Population by Race Alone and Hispanic or Latino
Origin for the United States and States: July 1, 2003 (SC-EST2003-04). Retrieved
January 11, 2005, from http://www.census.gov/popest/states/asrh/tables/SC-EST200304.xls

19

Liberation Hypothesis and Three Strikes

Vitiello, M. (1997a). Three Strikes and the Romero Case: The Supreme Court Restores
Democracy. Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review, 30, 1643-1708.
Vitiello, M. (1997b). Three Strikes: Can We Return to Rationality? Journal of Criminal Law &
Criminology, 87(2), 395-481.
Walker, S., Spohn, C., & DeLone, M. (1996). The Color of Justice: Race, Ethnicity, and Crime
in America. Belmont [Calif.]: Wadsworth Pub. Co.
Zimring, F. E., Hawkins, G., & Kamin, S. (2001). Punishment and Democracy: Three Strikes
and You're Out in California. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Zimring, F. E., Kamin, S., & Hawkins, G. (1999). Crime and Punishment in California: The
Impact of Three Strikes and You're Out. Berkeley, CA: Institute of Governmental Studies
Press.

20

Liberation Hypothesis and Three Strikes

Table 1: Racial Composition of California Population, Prison Inmates, and “Strikers”4

% of CA population
% of all inmates
% of 2nd strikers
% of 3rd strikers

White

Black

Latino

Asian &
Pacific
Islander

American
Indian

Other
Race

43.8
27.7
25.8
25.1

6.2
28.7
34.3
44.4

35.2
38.2
35.7
26.7

12.3
1.0
0.7
0.5

0.5
0.9
0.8
0.9

2.0
3.6
2.6
2.3
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Table 2: CDCR Dataset Summary Statistics

Race/Ethnicity

Place of Birth
Gender
Age

Current Parole
Return Status

Offense
Category
(General)
Offense Type
Highest
Strike Count

Asian
Black/African-American
Hispanic/Latino
American Indian
Other
White
United States
Outside the U.S.
Male
Female
14 to 24
25 to 34
35 to 44
45 to 54
55 to 64
65 and up
Admission
Parole violator with new term
Parole violator - return to custody
Pending revocation
Violent
Property
Drug
Other
Non-wobbler
Wobbler
None
2 Strikes
3 Strikes

N

22

Percent
0.96
28.7
38.2
0.95
3.6
27.7
83.6
16.4
93.3
6.7
26.8
33.6
26.0
11.0
2.1
0.4
62.9
24.8
9.0
3.3
50.3
21.3
20.6
7.7
67.9
32.1
73.2
21.7
5.1
171,163
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Table 4: Comparison of Outcomes for Wobblers and Non-Wobblers
DV = Three-Strikes Sentence
Wobbler Offenses

Black
Latino
Asian
American Indian
Other race
(Reference = White)
Born Outside the US
Latino and born outside the US
Asian and born outside the US
Male
(Reference = female)
Age 14-24
Age 25-34
Age 35-44
(Reference = Age 45-54)
Age 55-64
Ages 65 and up
Number of serious priors
Number of violent priors
Parole violator - new term
Parole violator - return to custody
Parole violator - pending revocation
(Reference = non-parolee admission)
(Offense category dummies omitted)
Individual county dummies omitted
N
LR chi2
D.F.
Prob > chi2
Pseudo R2

Non-Wobblers

Odds
Ratio
1.53
0.76
1.70
1.37
0.74

Std.
Err.
0.09
0.05
0.75
0.30
0.14

P>z
0.000
0.000
0.230
0.152
0.121

Odds
Ratio
1.44
1.01
0.98
1.45
1.17

Std.
Err.
0.06
0.05
0.34
0.24
0.13

P>z
0.000
0.784
0.951
0.024
0.158

0.77
1.56
0.28
5.04

0.14
0.31
0.20
0.93

0.137
0.029
0.081
0.000

0.76
1.03
1.05
5.10

0.09
0.13
0.46
0.76

0.015
0.819
0.904
0.000

0.25
1.39
1.66

0.04
0.11
0.12

0.000
0.000
0.000

0.29
0.99
1.35

0.02
0.05
0.07

0.000
0.856
0.000

1.19
2.37
1.88
1.86
1.20
0.00

0.19
0.79
0.04
0.03
0.06
0.00

0.268
0.010
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

0.84
1.36
1.65
1.76
1.63
0.00
0.00

0.10
0.32
0.02
0.02
0.05
0.00
0.00

0.161
0.181
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.005
0.000

51418
6585.6
85
0.000
0.316
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114693
14759.5
100
0.000
0.309
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Table 3: Logistic Model with and without Legally Relevant Variables
Dependent Variable = Three-Strikes Sentence

Black
Latino
Asian
American Indian
Other race
(Reference = White)
Born Outside the US
Latino and born outside the US
Asian and born outside the US
(Reference = US-born)
Male
(Reference = female)
Age 14-24
Age 25-34
Age 35-44
(Reference = Age 45-54)
Age 55-64
Ages 65 and up
Number of serious priors
Number of violent priors
Parole violator - new term
Parole violator - return to custody
Parole violator - pending revocation
(Reference = non-parolee admission)
(Offense category dummies omitted)
(County dummies omitted)
N
LR chi2
D.F.
Prob > chi2
Pseudo R2

Without Legally Relevant
Vars

With Legally Relevant
Vars

Odds
Ratio
1.85
0.98
1.00
1.42
1.05

Std. Err.
0.055
0.034
0.252
0.168
0.092

P>z
0.000
0.503
1.000
0.003
0.558

Odds
Ratio
1.47
0.93
1.16
1.40
1.04

Std.
Err.
0.051
0.036
0.318
0.183
0.101

P>z
0.000
0.048
0.579
0.011
0.675

0.63
0.97
1.01

0.053
0.094
0.331

0.000
0.728
0.975

0.76
1.15
0.76

0.073
0.125
0.276

0.005
0.196
0.456

9.25

1.015

0.000

5.05

0.587

0.000

0.16
0.89
1.45

0.009
0.032
0.051

0.000
0.001
0.000

0.30
1.11
1.45

0.019
0.049
0.061

0.000
0.015
0.000

0.84
1.03

0.068
0.170

0.033
0.869

0.96
1.58
1.73
1.80
1.45
0.00
0.00

0.093
0.297
0.018
0.017
0.039
0.000
0.001

0.689
0.016
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

170861
6266.2
66
0.000
0.091

169553
21328.8
105
0.000
0.309
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Table 5: Comparison of Outcomes by Offense Group; DV = Three-Strikes Sentence
Violent Offenses

Black
Latino
Asian
American Indian
Other race
(Reference = White)
Born Outside the US
Latino and born outside the US
Asian and born outside the US
Male
(Reference = female)
Age 14-24
Age 25-34
Age 35-44
(Reference = Age 45-54)
Age 55-64
Ages 65 and up
Number of serious priors
Number of violent priors
Parole violator - new term
Parole violator - return to custody
Parole violator - pending revocation
(Reference = non-parolee admission)
Offense category dummies omitted
County dummies omitted
N
LR chi2 (D.F.)
Prob > chi2
Pseudo R2

Property Offenses

Drug Offenses
Std.
Odds Ratio
Err.
1.52
0.14
1.16
0.11
0.00
0.00
3.09
0.96
1.26
0.33

Odds Ratio
1.35
0.86
0.70
1.18
1.01

Std. Err.
0.07
0.05
0.31
0.21
0.14

P>z
0.000
0.008
0.417
0.345
0.937

Odds Ratio
1.76
0.94
2.93
1.27
1.02

Std. Err.
0.12
0.07
1.19
0.39
0.20

P>z
0.000
0.421
0.008
0.432
0.909

0.72
0.98
1.20
5.32

0.10
0.15
0.65
1.13

0.015
0.914
0.733
0.000

0.83
1.66
0.23
5.11

0.15
0.34
0.16
0.94

0.306
0.015
0.039
0.000

0.89
1.13
dropped
5.27

0.23
0.32

0.654
0.671

1.31

0.000

0.27
0.80
1.15

0.02
0.05
0.07

0.000
0.001
0.024

0.22
1.40
1.73

0.04
0.12
0.14

0.000
0.000
0.000

0.25
1.65
1.82

0.07
0.17
0.18

0.000
0.000
0.000

1.17
1.28
1.78
1.75
1.75
0.00
dropped

0.15
0.30
0.03
0.02
0.07
0.00

0.212
0.294
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

0.74
2.08
1.75
1.88
1.30
0.00
dropped

0.17
0.88
0.03
0.04
0.07
0.00

0.177
0.085
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

0.77
1.09
1.58
1.73
1.32
dropped
0.02

0.19
0.81
0.04
0.03
0.09

0.298
0.905
0.000
0.000
0.000

0.02

0.000

83914
10428.0
0.000
0.307

34055
5920.7
0.000
0.339

(82)

25

(72)

30251
2614.6
0.000
0.244

(64)

P>z
0.000
0.132
0.000
0.000
0.384

